Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Territorial Savings and Loan Association v. John N.
Baird, aka John Baird; Joy K. Baird; and John Knapp
Baird Trustee of the Koa Irrevoable Trust : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Norman J. Younker, Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell; attorneys for plaintiffappellant.
Randall S. Feil, Michael L. Ferrin; Edwards & McCoy; attorneys for defendants-respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Territorial Savings v. Baird, No. 890275 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1845

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH **?•' " ^ ^ F APPEALS
UTAH
DOCU*v»Li'>s r
KFU
50
DOCKET NO.

o ^ ^ ^ T
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERRITORIAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 870234

vs.

(Category 14b)

JOHN N. BAIRD a.k.a. JOHN
BAIRD; JOY K. BAIRD; AND
JOHN KNAPP BAIRD TRUSTEE OF
THE KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST,

89-

Defendants-Respondents.
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA
Norman J. Younker
Merrill F. Nelson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Randall S. Feil (A-1052)
Michael L. Ferrin (A-4831)
EDWARDS & McCOY
57 West 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

fag r=VAR 0 1883

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERRITORIAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 870234

vs.

(Category 14b)

JOHN N. BAIRD a.k.a. JOHN
BAIRD; JOY K. BAIRD; AND
JOHN KNAPP BAIRD TRUSTEE OF
THE KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
Defendants-Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA
Norman J. Younker
Merrill F. Nelson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Randall S. Feil (A-1052)
Michael L. Ferrin (A-4831)
EDWARDS & McCOY
57 West 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

9

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

10

THE BONA FIDE NATURE OF THE DEBTS ASSUMED
BY THE KOA TRUST WAS NOT DISPUTED BY TSL
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE IS NOT
SUBJECT TO DISPUTE ON APPEAL

11

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BAIRD'S
TRANSFERS TO THE KOA TRUST ARE NOT VOID
PURSUANT TO § 25-1-11, THE GRANTOR-TRUST
STATUTE

15

A.
B.

The Grantor-Trust Statute Does
Apply to Transfers of Real Property . . . .
The KOA Trust is Not "For the Use
of" Defendant Baird

15
16

III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
TRANSFERS TO THE TRUST DO NOT VIOLATE § 25-1-4 . . 23
A.
B.

IV.

V.

TSL's Creditor Status
Lack of Fair Consideration
1.
Fair Equivalent Exchange
2.
Good Faith

TSL DID NOT RAISE THE "ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD"
THEORY AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND SHOULD
THEREFORE BE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING IT ON
APPEAL

24
26
26
31

38

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY THE STANDARDS AND BURDENS OF PROOF IT IMPOSED . 43

CONCLUSION

49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A & M Enterprises. Inc. v. Hunziker
25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700 (1971)
Alphin Realty. Inc. v. Sine
595 P. 2d 860 (Utah 1979)

Page
12, 42
10

Arnovitz v. Telia
495 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1972)

44

Bank of Cave Spring v. Gold Kist. Inc.
173 Ga. App. 679, 327 S.E.2d 800 (1985)

22

Barker v. Dunham
9 Utah 2d 244, 342 P.2d 867 (1959)

48

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co.
667 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984)

10

Boccalero v. Bee
102 Utah 12, 1226 P.2d 1063 (1942)

29, 37, 47

Brimhall v. Grow
25 Utah 2d 298, 480 P.2d 731 (1971)

46

Bundv v. Century Equipment Co.
692 Utah 754, 758 (1984)

39

Butler v. Wilkinson
740 P.2d 1244, 1261 (Utah 1987)

20, 32

Cardon v. Harper
106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99 (1944)

48

Clegg v. Lee
30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973)

42

Commercial National Bank v. Page & Brinton
45 Utah 14, 27, 142 P. 709, 714 (1914)

20

Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co.
695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984)

11

Dahnken. Inc. v. Wilmarth
726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986)

37

Davis v. Mulholland
24 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970)

39

Eskelson v. Inter-County Title Guaranty & Mortgage Co.
207 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1960)
First Security Bank v. Vrontikis
26 Utah 2d 422, 490 P.2d 1301 (1971)
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.
659 P. 2d 1140 (Utah 1983)

19, 27
27
12, 38

Furniture Manufacturers Sales. Inc. v. Deamer
680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984) . . . . 23, 25, 26, 32, 43, 46
Geary v. Cain
79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396, 398-399 (1932)
Givan v. Lambeth
10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 963 (1960) . .

15
13, 29, 31, 35,
49

Gustin v. Matthews
25 Utah 168, 70 P. 402 (1902)

48

Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin
14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962)

42

Hoppe Hardware Co. v. Bain
21 Okla. 177, 95 P. 765 (1908)

22

In Re Baxters Estate
399 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1965)

44

In re Borne's Will
158 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-1013 (1957)

21

In re Grooms
13 B.R. 376, 379-84 (Bankr. Utah 1981)

48

In re Richardson
23 B.R. 434, 442-448

(Bankr. Utah 1982)

Jensen v. Eames
30 Utah 2d 243, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974)
Leach v. Anderson
535 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975)
Liberty Storage & Warehouse Co. v. VanWyck
256 A.D. 641, 11 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1930)
Lund v. Howell
92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937)

29

44
17-19, 22, 44
21
29, 37, 47

Matusik V, Large
85 Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457 (1969)

27

McDonald v. Breinholt
21 Utah 2d 9, 934 P.2d 462 (1968)

42

McMillan v. McMillan
245 P. 98 (Idaho 1926)

24

Meyer v. General American Corp.
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977)
Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White
131 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962)

25-27, 37, 48
20, 27, 29

Nelson v. Hansen
278 Or. 571, 565 P.2d 727 (1977)

22

Obradovich v. Walker Brothers
80 Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (1932)

38

Qgden State Bank v. Barker
12 Utah 13, 40 P.765 (1895)
Paull v. Zions First National Bank
417 P.2d 759, 761 (Utah 1966)

25, 48
44

Paxton v. Paxton
80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932)

47, 48

Peterson v. Wilson
88 Cal.App. 2d 617, 199 P.2d 757, 7523 (1948) . . . .

27, 28

Pioneer Finance and Thrift Co.v. Powell
21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d 389 (1968)

42

Road Runner Inn, Inc. v. Merrill
605 P.2d 776 (Utah 1980)

29

Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc.
605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1975)

42

Simpson v. General Motors.
24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970))

39

Smith v. Edwards,
81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932)

48

Smith v. Whitman
189 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. 1963)

32

-iv-

United States Building & Loan Association v,
Midvale Home Finance Corp.
86 Utah 522, 46 P.2d 672, 673 (1935)

38

Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. Association
92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741 (1937)

27-29

Wagner v. United States
573 F.2d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1978)

17

Williams v. Petersen
86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935)

48

Zuniga v. Evans
87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513 (1935)

47, 48

Other Authorities
37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 22 (1968)

26

37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 219 (1943)

21

Rule

3(h) of the Rules of Practice in
District Court of the State of Utah

Rule 56(e), Utah R.Civ.P

the

Third

Judicial
8
1

U.C.A. § 57-1-32 (1953 as amended)

32

U.C.A. § 70A-1-201(19) (1953 as amended)

31

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i)

1

Utah Constitution Art. VIII, § 3

1

Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act
§ 25-1-1
§ 25-1-3
§ 25-1-4
§ 25-1-7 and -8
§ 25-1-11

-v-

7
26, 31
passim
passim
passim

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court
granting summary judgment for the defendant trustee.

The Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Constitution Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did

the

district

court

rule

correctly

that

the

challenged transfers were not void pursuant to § 25-1-11, the
grantor-trust statute?
2.

Did the district court rule correctly as a matter of

law and undisputed fact that the challenged transfers were not
constructively fraudulent pursuant to § 25-1-4?
3*

Did the plaintiff TSL fail to raise the theory of

"actual intent to defraud,"

§ 25-1-7, at the trial court level

or in the alternative, did the district court properly rule as a
matter of law that the transfers were not actually fraudulent
under § 25-1-7?
4.
standards

Did the district court commit reversible error by the
and

burdens

of

proof

it

imposed

under

the

Utah

Fraudulent Conveyance Act?
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Resolution

of

the

issues

presented

on

appeal

will

be

determined by construction of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act
U.C.A., 1953 §§ 25-1-4, -7, -8 and -11, and Rule 56(e), Utah
R.Civ.P., set out verbatim in the Addendum.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a garnishment proceeding by Territorial Savings &
Loan Association ("TSL") to enforce a Hawaii deficiency judgment
against John N. Baird ("Baird") and his wife Joy K. Baird.

In

the context of the garnishment TSL sought, pursuant to the Utah
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, to set aside Baird's transfer of the
Meadowview

Convalescent

Irrevocable Trust.

Center

("Meadowview")

(R. 633, Tabs 1-4.)

to

the

KOA

TSL filed a motion for

summary judgment and the trustee filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment.

(R. 92-110, 137-72.)

The district court denied TSL's

motion and granted the trustee's motion, upholding the challenged
transfer.

(R. 432-37; Add. 1-6.)

Thereafter TSL filed this

appeal (R. 449).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant John Nelson Baird

("Baird") is a retired bank

president who has been involved in a number of investments and
business ventures.
the Meadowview
Utah.

One of these was his purchase and leasing of

Convalescent

Center

("Meadowview")

in Murray,

(Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R. 180-186, Add. 25. 26.)
Since

1975 Baird borrowed

over $240,000.00

in unsecured

loans from six businessmen who were his friends (the "non-family
creditors").

These loans were all evidenced by promissory notes

executed

the

at

time

of

the

loans.

Baird

also

borrowed

$11,250.00 from his wife, Joy K. Baird, but did not evidence the
loan by a promissory note executed at the time of the loan.
2
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approximately

$1.69

million and had a monthly lease income of approximately

$16,000.00.

Also, at that time Meadowview was encumbered by two

mortgages totaling approximately $1.2 million and had monthly
mortgage payments of approximately $15,000.00.

(Deposition of

John Nelson Baird, at 21-22, and depo Exhibit 2, Sched. D.)
Contemporaneous

with

the

execution

of

the

trust, Baird

signed promissory notes to David Baird, John Knapp Baird, and Joy
(the "family creditors") evidencing Bairdfs debt for

K. Baird

the services rendered by David and John Knapp, and the money
loaned by Joy.

(Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at 53 and depo

Exhibit "3".)
As
trust,

consideration
the

trust

for the

assumed

conveyance

the

obligations

of Meadowview
of

Baird

to

into
the

Meadowview mortgagees, to the non-family creditors, and to the
family creditors.
to

pay

Baird

As additional consideration the trust agreed

$30,000.00.

The

precise

amounts

of

Baird1s

obligations assumed by the trust were as follows:
Mortgages on Meadowview

$1,225,000.00

Notes to the non-family creditors
245,467.93
(does not include accrued
interest)
Notes to the family creditors

4

136,250.00

Note payable to Baird

30,000,00

TOTAL (excluding accrued interest) $1,621,717.931
(Deposition of John Nelson

Baird, Exhibit "1".)

By its express terms, the trust completely divests Baird1s
ownership and control over Meadowview and its income and gives
full ownership and control to the trustee, John Knapp Baird.

The

trustee is required to use the trust income to pay the debts in
the following priority:
A.

The Meadowview mortgages;

B.

The notes of the non-family creditors, the family

creditors and Baird, in such amounts and at such times as the
trustee in his discretion deems appropriate but not more than
twenty years from the date of the trust; and
C.

If Baird himself pays or satisfies any portion of the

debts assumed by the trust, then the trust is to reimburse Baird
for such payments or satisfaction.

(KOA Irrevocable Trust, R.

212-213, Add. 9.)
When

all

of

the

debts

of

the

specified

creditors

are

satisfied, the trustee may distribute income to Baird's children.
The trustee has no discretion or power to pay to Baird trust
income for his personal needs or wants.

1

(KOA Irrevocable Trust,

The trust also assumed substantial accrued interest on
the notes to the non-family creditors which brings the total
value of the consideration given by the trust to over $1.7
million.
5

R. 213-214, Add. 7-14.)
For almost 2 years after the trust was created, the tenant
of Meadowview continued to send its lease checks to Baird.

Baird

observed the trust formalities by endorsing all such checks over
to the KOA Irrevocable Trust and mailing them to the trustee.
After about 2 years, Baird requested that the Meadowview tenant
make checks out directly to the trust and mail them to the
trustee, which the tenant did.

(Deposition of John Nelson Baird,

at 72-76.)
In the first month during the transition period immediately
after the trust was created, Baird himself made one of the
Meadowview mortgage payments and the trust reimbursed him for
such payment in accordance with its terms.
all such payments since.

The trust has made

(Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at

142, 144-45.)
Eventually, the Bairds were unable to make their payments to
TSL, and TSL initiated foreclosure proceedings in October 1985,
some sixteen months after the transfer of Meadowview to the
Trust.

As of June 1984, the appraised value of Baird's home,

according to TSL, was $555,000.00, which was still more than the
sum of the first and second mortgages.

(Affidavit of Norman Mau,

R. 326; affidavit of Vernon Hirata, R. 633 Tab 1.)

At the

foreclosure sale TSL bid only $385,000, which after paying the
first mortgagor left a deficiency of $237,174.79.
Vernon Hirata, R. 633 Tab 1.)

(Affidavit of

TSL obtained a Hawaii deficiency
6

judgment for that amount, and filed it in Salt Lake County, Utah.
TSL served

a writ of garnishment on the trustee seeking to

garnish the lease payments from the Meadowview tenant to the
trust.

It is in the context of the garnishment that this action

arises.
In response to TSL's writ, the trustee answered

that the

trust only owed $2,000 to Baird, having previously paid $28,000
on the $30,000 note to Baird.

Pursuant to Rule 64D(i) , Utah

R.Civ.P., TSL filed a reply which alleged that Baird's transfer
of

Meadowview

to

the

trust

violated

the

Utah

Fraudulent

Conveyance Act, § 25-1-1 et seq. , and TSL sought to have the
conveyance of Meadowview to the trust disregarded.
TSL subsequently moved for summary judgment on its reply,
and based its motion on three legal theories:
1.

The trust was void pursuant to § 25-1-11, the "grantor

trust" statute;
2.

The trust was void pursuant to the common law because

it preferred certain creditors over TSL; and
3.
U.C.A.,

The transfer was constructively fraudulent pursuant to
1953,

§25-1-4,

entitled

"Conveyances

by

insolvent."

(Transcript of proceedings, R. 664-665.)
As part of its motion for summary judgment, TSL did not
argue, as it does now on appeal, a legal theory based on the
actual intent to defraud statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-1-7 and 251-8.

[See Memorandum

in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
7

for

Summary Judgment on Reply To Answers of Garnishee John Knapp
Baird (hereafter "TSL's Original Memo"); R. 96, 99;

Reply to

Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment Creditors Motion for Summary
Judgment

and

in

Opposition

to

Trustees

Motion

for

Judgment (hereafter "TSL's Reply Memo"), R. 293-294;
of proceedings, R. 664-665.]

Summary

transcript

Never, prior to this appeal, has

TSL ever mentioned § 25-1-7 or otherwise raised the issue of
actual fraud in its pleadings or argument.
Memo R.

(See TSL's Original

92-108; TSL's Reply Memo R. 292; and transcript of

proceedings, R. 634-697.)
The trustee responded to TSL's motion by way of a crossmotion

for

summary

judgment.

The

trustee

asserted

as

an

undisputed, material fact, supported by affidavits, that all of
the debts assumed by the trust were good faith debts Baird had
promised

to

Plaintiff's
Trustee'

repay.
Motion

Motion

[Trustee's Memorandum
for

for

Summary
Summary

Original Memo") R. 148.]
TSL filed its

Judgment
judgment

in Opposition

and

in

(hereafter

Support

to
of

"Trustees

In opposition to defendants' motion,

Reply Memo which did not begin with a statement of

disputed material facts and which did not challenge or dispute
the trustee's affidavits.

Thus, the facts set forth in the

trustee's Memorandum as "Undisputed Facts" are deemed admitted.
(Rule

3 (h) of the Rules

of

Practice

in the Third Judicial

District Court of the State of Utah; Add. 97, 98).
The trial court found that disputed issues of fact existed
8

as to TSL's motion and denied summary judgment for TSL.

The

court also found that no disputed issues of material fact existed
as to the trustee's motion and granted summary judgment for the
trustee.

("Order re: Summary Judgment" R. 432-437, Add. 1-6.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

TSL has raised four "issues presented on appeal" which are
each addressed below.

As an initial matter which relates to each

of the issues, it must be assumed that the debts assumed by the
KOA Irrevocable Trust were bona fide due to the failure of TSL to
dispute this issue before the lower court.
With respect to the first issue presented on appeal, the
District Court properly ruled that, as a matter of law, the
conveyance was not made for Baird's "use and benefit" under § 251-11 because that statute is not applicable to transfers of
interests in real property, and Baird did not retain the type of
benefit contemplated by the statute.
With respect to the second issue presented on appeal, the
District Court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the
conveyance

was

not

constructively

fraudulent

under

§25-1-4

because TSL is not a "creditor" within the meaning of that
section and because the conveyance was clearly made for fair
consideration.
With respect to the third issue presented on appeal, the
issue of whether the conveyance was actually fraudulent under §§
25-1-7 and 8 was never raised at any time in the proceedings
9

before the District Court, and therefore cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.

In any event, sufficient evidence was

before the District Court to enable it to correctly rule as a
matter of law that the conveyance was not actually fraudulent
under U.C.A. §§ 25-1-7 and 8.
With respect to the fourth issue presented on appeal, the
District Court applied the proper standards and burdens of proof
on each issue it addressed, and alternatively, any such error
made by the District was not prejudicial.
ARGUMENT
Summary judgment may be rendered when "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."
Under the accepted rules of

Rule 56(c), Utah R.Civ.P.

appellate review, this court will

affirm the trial court's decision whenever it can do so on a
proper ground, even though it was not the ground on which the
trial court based its ruling.
Neeley

Construction

Co.. 667

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v.
P.2d

1120

(Utah

Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979).

1984) ; Alphin

It is evident in

this case that, based on the undisputed facts and applicable law,
the KOA Irrevocable Trust is a valid and enforceable trust and
should be upheld.
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POINT I
The Bona Fide Nature of the Debts
Assumed by the KOA Trust
Was Not Disputed By TSL Before the Trial Court
and Therefore Is Not Subject
to Dispute on Appeal
Before responding to the individual points argued by TSL on
appeal, defendants wish to address an issue that
several of those points •

overarches

This issue is that at the trial court

level defendants filed affidavits showing the debts assumed by
the KOA Trust were bona fide, and TSL did not file counter
affidavits and did not otherwise dispute defendants' affidavits•
TSL therefore should not be allowed to dispute this fact on
appeal.
Rule 56(e), Utah R.Civ.P., provides that where a party who
moves for summary judgment supports his statement of undisputed
facts by affidavit, the party opposing summary judgment may not
rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleading.

Instead the

opposing party must file a response, by affidavit or as otherwise
provided, that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
respond,

summary

"If [the opposing party] does not so

judgment,

if appropriate,

shall

be

entered

against him." Id.
This rule has been applied

in numerous cases to uphold

summary judgments where, as in this case, the party opposing
summary judgment failed to dispute the facts below but then
sought to dispute them on appeal.
11

For example, in Cowen and Co.

v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984), plaintiff
moved for summary judgment and filed a supporting affidavit that
plaintiff was a "bona fide purchaser" of certain stock.
defendants
motion,

did

did

not
not

proffer

affidavits

challenge

the

in opposition

sufficiency

of

Summary

bona

judgment

appealed.

fide
was

purchaser
rendered

status to

the

for plaintiff,

to the

plaintiff's

affidavit, and did not otherwise raise the factual
plaintiff's

The

issue of

trial court.

and

defendants

This Court affirmed on the basis of Rule 56(e) and on

the ground that defendants could not raise on appeal issues not
raised before the trial court.

695 P.2d at 113-114.

See also

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co. , 659 P.2d 1140
(Utah 1983); A & M Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363,
482 P.2d 700 (1971).
In this case, the Trustee's Original Memo stated as an
undisputed, material fact that "each of the obligations owed by
Mr. Baird which were assumed by the Trust in consideration for
the transfer of [Meadowview] were good faith debts owed by Mr.
Baird which he promised to repay."
148.)

(Trustee's Original Memo, R.

In support of this statement were attached the affidavits

of Baird (R. 180-186, Add. 21-29), his sons David (R. 263-264,
Add. 84, 85) and John Knapp (R. 244-245, Add. 89, 90), and his
wife Joy.

2

(R. 265-266, Add. 91, 92.)

2

Regarding the alleged

Portions of Baird's affidavit (R. 184) bear reproducing
here, because they explain in detail how the debts to his family
arose:
12

lack of documentation of Baird's debts to his sons and wife, it
should be noted that when family members deal with a father,
"they naturally [do] not deal at arm's length" but have faith in
a father's intention "to eventually make it right with all of
them."

Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 963 (1960)

(upholding

father's

conveyance

to

sons

despite

lack

of

documentation of debt due to them.)
Before responding to the trustee's motion, TSL requested and
received

time

in

which

to

conduct

Thereafter TSL filed its Reply Memo.

additional

discovery.

TSL's Reply Memo did not

attack the sufficiency or veracity of the affidavits filed by the
trustee in support of his motion.

TSL's Reply Memo was not

33. The KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST has assumed my
obligation to David Lincoln Baird in an amount equal to
$50,000.00. This amount owing arose as a result of his
services.
Specifically, he served as a property
manager and accountant for John Nelson Baird with
respect to my properties in Honolulu, Hawaii. He also
assisted me in preparing for the start-up of Lincoln
Distributors, a food distribution company located in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
34.

The

KOA

IRREVOCABLE

TRUST

has

assumed

my

obligation to Joy K. Baird, David Lincoln Baird,
Randall P. Baird, in an amount equal to $11,250.00.
This amount owing arose as a result of their interest
in personal funds loaned to me by Joy K. Baird. These
funds were held for the purpose of schooling, etc.
35. The KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST has assumed my
obligation to John Knapp Baird in an amount equal to
$75,000.00. This amount owing arose as a result of his
services. Specifically, he acted as a property manager
and attorney for me with respect to certain real
property and other assets.
13

accompanied by any affidavits disputing the bona fide nature of
the debts assumed by the KOA Trust.

TSL's Reply Memo did not, as

required by former Rule 2 (h) (now Rule 3 (h)) of the "Rules of
Practice in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of
Utah," begin with a section containing "a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue
exists."

(R. 292-327)

Although the memo mentioned the close

family relationship as a "badge of fraud," it did so in the
context

of

a

burden-shifting

argument

and

never

actually

addressed the issue of whether the family debts were bona fide.
(TSL!s Reply Memo R. 306-307.)
Neither did TSL challenge, at the hearing on the crossmotions for summary judgment, the testimony set forth in the
affidavits or the portion of the Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in the Trustee's Original Memo which established the bona
fide nature of the family debt.

(Transcript, R. 834-898.)

In short, the trustee asserted by affidavit that the debts
assumed by the trust were bona fide, and TSL did not file counter
affidavits or otherwise challenge the trustee's affidavits and
assertions on this issue.

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 56(e),

Utah R.Civ.P., and Rule 3(h) of the Rules of Practice in the
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, the facts set
forth in the Statement of Undisputed

Facts in the Trustee's

Original Memo are deemed admitted, and TSL can not now dispute
this fact on appeal in an attempt to create an issue of material
14

fact requiring a remand to the trial court.

As will be seen

below, the bona fide nature of the debts assumed by the trust
relates to several of TSL's arguments on appeal.
POINT II
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That
Baird's Transfers to the KOA Trust Are Not
Void Pursuant to S 25-1-11 the Grantor-Trust Statute
TSL argued to the trial court and argues in its Point I on
appeal

that

Baird's

transfer

of

Meadowview

to

the

KOA

Irrevocable Trust was void pursuant to the grantor-trust statute,
U.C.A. § 25-1-11 (1953).

The trial court correctly ruled as a

matter of law that § 25-1-11 does not void the transfer.
ruling is correct because

This

(a) that statute does not apply to

transfers of real property, and (b) the KOA Irrevocable Trust is
not "for the use of" defendant Baird.
A. The Grantor-Trust Statute
Transfers of Real Property.

Does

Not

Apply

to

The grantor-trust statute, § 25-1-11, provides:
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers, or
assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or
things in action made in trust for the use of the
person making the same shall be void as against the
existing or subsequent creditors of such person.
[Emphasis added.]
The emphasized language, which TSL has ellipsed out in its own
brief (p. 8 thereof), expressly provides that the statute applies
only to transfers of personal property, and not real property.
This Court has so interpreted that language in Geary v. Cain. 79
Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396, 398-399 (1932).
15

"[The statute] relates

only to

'goods, chattels, or things in action, • which in any

sense of the terms are not real property."

9 P.2d at 399.

Accordingly, Baird's transfer of Meadowview, which is real
property, does not fall within the scope of the statute.
Furthermore, even if § 25-1-11 did apply to the Meadowview
conveyance, that section is still not applicable to the KOA
Irrevocable Trust, as discussed below.
B.

The KOA Trust is Not "For the Use of" Defendant

Baird.
The KOA Irrevocable Trust is not the type of trust that §
25-1-11 was intended to invalidate.

Section 25-1-11, quoted in

full above, invalidates trusts only if they are "for the use of"
the grantor.

The KOA Irrevocable Trust is not for the use of its

grantor, Baird, because the purpose of the trust is to pay
Baird's creditors.

TSL argues that the KOA trust is for Baird's

use and benefit because in exchange for the trust property, the
trust assumed the debts of Baird and agreed to pay Baird an
additional

$30,000 as part consideration.

TSL has cited no

authority whatsoever for its proposition that the assumption of
the grantor's debts or the payment of consideration by a trust
renders a trust "for the use of" the grantor within the meaning
of the statute, and clearly that is not the law.

The trust

actually benefits Baird's creditors, not Mr. Baird.

Baird has

not reserved any power of revocation or control over the trust;
Baird has not insulated from creditors any trust payments he
16

receives; and the only benefit he received by creating the trust
was the consideration given by the trust (i.e., assumption of
Baird's debts and $30,000 note to Baird) in exchange for the
trust's only asset, Meadowview.
A case directly on point is Wagner v. United States, 573
F.2d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1978).

In Wagner the grantor created

a trust to which he assigned $500.00 per month of his wages and
commissions.

The purpose of the trust was to pay one of the

grantor's unsecured creditors.

The Internal Revenue Service,

also a creditor of the grantor, sought to void the assignments on
the basis of Indiana's grantor-trust statute, which is nearly
identical to Utah's grantor-trust statute.

The court held that

since the trust funds were to be used to pay the grantor's debts,
those funds were not "for the use of" the grantor.
The foregoing interpretation of "for the use of" is also
supported by the leading Utah case of Leach v. Anderson. 535 P.2d
1241 (Utah 1975).
trust

Leach contains a prime example of the type of

§25-1-11 was intended to invalidate.

In Leach, Norma

Anderson, the judgment debtor, was both grantor and beneficiary
of

a

trust

lifestyle.

which

was

entirely

committed

to

maintain

her

The trustee was empowered to pay to Norma Anderson

such portions of the trust as were necessary to maintain her
standard of living; purchase for her a new automobile every two
or three years; provide vacations for her; provide her sufficient
funds

to

maintain

her

home;

and
17

provide

her

other

living

accommodations according to her needs.

The terms of the trust

also granted her continued powers and privileges concerning the
ownership

and

control

over

portions

of

the

trust

res.

Significantly, the trust contained a spendthrift clause providing
that no payments from the trust to Anderson were liable to legal
process by Anderson's creditors.
Anderson's judgment creditor sued under § 25-1-11 to satisfy
his judgment debt of $13,795.67 against the trust assets, which
included very substantial personal property.

The trial court

ruled for the judgment creditor, and this Court affirmed.

The

Court explained that § 25-1-11 applies only to trusts in which
the

grantor

can

"enjoy

substantially

all

the

advantages of

ownership" and at the same time place his property beyond the
legitimate claims of creditors.

535 P. 2d at 1243.

The Court

emphasized that the statute was not intended to limit "other
traditional and beneficial uses" of trusts, including, as in the
instant case, irrevocable trusts.
because

the

entire

aim

of

the

Id.
trust

The Court reasoned that
was

to

support Norma

Anderson, the trust was in essence for her use and benefit.

Id.

at 1243-44.
The KOA Irrevocable Trust is very different from the trust
in Leach v. Anderson, for these reasons:
1.

Unlike Leach, the KOA Trust has no provisions for the

support and maintenance of Baird.

The only payments Baird is

entitled to from the trust are $30,000 in part consideration for
18

Meadowview, and reimbursement to Baird in direct proportion to
any payments or satisfaction by Baird of the debts assumed by the
trust.
2.

In Leach the "entire trust res, income and principal"

was committed to maintain the lifestyle of Norma Anderson.

The

KOA Trust, in contrast, has committed its entire trust asset of
$1.7 million to pay Baird"s creditors, except for payment of the
$30,000 note to Baird as part consideration

for transfer of

Meadowview to the trust.
3.

In Leach the spendthrift provision prevented creditors

from garnishing or attaching any amounts due to Norma Anderson.
535 P. 2d at 1243.

In contrast, the KOA Trust has no such

provision with respect to Baird and makes no attempt to insulate
any payments to Baird from creditors.
4.

Unlike the grantor in Leach, Baird has retained no

beneficial interest in the property whatsoever.
completely

irrevocable

and

Baird

has

no

The Trust is

discretion

over

distribution of proceeds or property under the Trust.
Certainly the KOA Irrevocable Trust is not the type of trust
contemplated by § 25-1-11 and the case law which invalidates
grantor trusts.
even

the

The alleged benefit retained by Baird is not

reservation

consideration

exchanged

of
to

an

interest,

the

grantor

but
at

is
the

merely
time

fair

of the

grantorfs transfer of the trust property into the trust.

See,

e.g., Eskelson v. Inter-County Title Guaranty & Mortgage Co.. 207
19

N.Y.S.2d

27

(1960)

consideration

(assumption

for

conveyance

of
of

mortgage
real

debt

is

property) .

fair
Under

plaintiff's argument, a grantor of property to a trust could not
receive anything, let alone fair consideration, in exchange for
the trust property without the trust being
pursuant to § 25-1-11.

rendered

invalid

But if the grantor did transfer property

in trust without receiving fair consideration in exchange, the
transfer would be in danger of being voided pursuant to § 2 5-1-4
for lack of fair consideration.
Point III.B., infra.)

(See discussion of § 25-1-4,

Obviously the receipt of consideration by

the grantor is not the type of benefit prohibited by § 25-1-11.
TSL argues that Baird has benefitted because, by preferring
the

trust

creditors.

creditors,

Baird

is

judgment

proof

as

to

other

However, Utah law is well-settled that it is entirely

permissible for a debtor to prefer one creditor over another,
even if the debtor is insolvent, so long as the debt is bona
fide.

Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d

1244, 1261 (Utah 1987);

Commercial National Bank v. Page & Brinton, 45 Utah 14, 27, 142
P. 709, 714 (1914).

As discussed in Point I, supra. TSL did not

dispute at the trial level the bona fide nature of the debts
assumed by the KOA Irrevocable Trust.

In addition, the mere fact

that some of the preferred creditors are close relatives makes no
difference.

See, e.g. , Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 131 Utah 2d

173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962) (upholding preference from son to father
where pre-existing debt was showed to be bona fide)•
20

TSL argues that a trust to prefer creditors is invalid if
the grantor reserves any benefit whatsoever to himself.
clearly not the law.

This is

As a general proposition of law, a trust is

not void in its entirety merely because the grantor reserves some
small or incidental benefits to himself.

In re Borne's Will, 158

N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-1013 (1957); Liberty Storage & Warehouse Co.
v. VanWyck, 256 A.D. 641, 11 N.Y.S.2d
Fraudulent Conveyances § 219 (1943).

92

(1930); 37 C.J.S.

Benefits which a grantor

may reserve that do not invalidate the trust include the right to
repurchase trust property on satisfaction of indebtedness; the
right to surplus proceeds after payment of the debt secured; the
right to direct the direction of surplus proceeds; and rights
which, whether expressed or not, the law would confer anyway on
the grantor.

37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances at §§ 218, 224,

225.
In this case the alleged benefits received by Baird were not
"reserved" by him but were given as consideration by the Trust
for the property at the time of transfer.

The alleged "benefit"

to Baird from the right to reimbursement from the trust if Baird
pays a portion of the debts assumed by the trust is not a benefit
at all inasmuch as he receives nothing from such a transaction,
but is simply reimbursed for any expenditures made in payment of
trust obligations.

Furthermore, Baird would have had the right

to such reimbursement regardless of whether it had been expressly
reserved in the trust.
21

The cases cited by TSL are not to the contrary.

Both Bank

of Cave Spring v. Gold Kist, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 679, 327 S.E.2d
800

(1985) and Nelson v. Hansen, 278 Or. 571, 565 P.2d 727

(1977), uphold the validity of the trusts in question.
Hardware

Co. v.

Bain, 21 Okla.

distinguishable,

in

that

177, 95

there

the

P.

debtor

765

Hoppe

(1908),

reserved

is

very

substantial benefits: the debtor had complete control over the
transferred assets

(he placed them in a corporation and made

himself president and general manager) and he reserved himself a
profitable salary from the assets.

Here, Baird has relinquished

control and has no right to further payments from the trust,
except the reimbursement already discussed and distinguished.
TSL argues that Baird retains and enjoys substantially all
previous advantages of ownership while at the same time placing
the property out of the reach of creditors.

But Baird has

clearly given up all his previous advantages of ownership, since
he can no longer use the Meadowview income or any portion of it
for his personal use and because he no longer has any control
over the disposition of such income or property.

And to the

extent that he does receive any payments from the trust, those
can be reached by creditors.
In sum, the KOA Irrevocable Trust is a valid trust for the
benefit

of

creditors.

It

is

different

in all

significant

respects from the trust in Leach, is not the type of trust § 251-11 was intended to prevent, and § 25-1-11 applies only to
22

personal property.
POINT III
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled
That the Transfers to the Trust
Do Not Violate S 25-1-4
TSL argued to the trial court

and argues as its Point II on

appeal that the transfer of Meadowview to the KOA Trust was
constructively fraudulent pursuant to U.C.A., § 25-1-4 (1953).
The trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that TSL
failed to prove all three elements of § 25-1-4.
Section 25-1-4 provides:
Every conveyance made, and every obligation
incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors,
without regard to actual intent, if the conveyance is
made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration.
As TSL acknowledges in its brief, it cannot prevail under §
25-1-4 unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence all
three of the following elements:

(1)

TSL was a creditor of

Baird; (2) Baird was insolvent or was rendered insolvent by the
conveyance,

and

consideration.

(3)

the

conveyance

was

made

without

fair

Furniture Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v. Deamerf

680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984).

If TSL fails to prove even one of

these elements, its claim under §25-1-4 must fail.

Id.

The

undisputed facts show that TSL failed to prove element (1), TSL's
creditor status, and element (3), lack of fair consideration.
Material issues of fact were left unresolved with respect to
element

(2), Baird's

insolvency,
23

due

to

the

conflicting

affidavits filed by both sides regarding this issue•

TSL spends

several pages in its brief reviewing the evidence it presented on
this issue but completely ignores the extensive and competent
evidence introduce by Baird on this issue.
this

case, however,

inasmuch

as

TSL

This is immaterial to

has

clearly

failed

to

establish the other two elements.
A.

TSLfs Creditor Status
By its terms, § 25-1-4 only applies to persons who are

creditors at the time of the conveyance.

In contrast, other

sections of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act speak of "both present
and future creditors."

§§ 25-1-6, 25-1-7 (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that at the time Baird conveyed Meadowview
to the KOA Irrevocable Trust, TSL was fully secured. Furthermore,
at

the

time

TSL

sold

and

purchased

the

foreclosure sale it was still fully secured.

property

at

the

The property was

appraised at $555,000.00 as of the date of the transfer, more
than enough value to cover both the first and second mortgages.
(Affidavit of Norman Mau, R. 326.)
TSL purchased
$385,000.00.

the property
(Affidavit

of

at

The deficiency resulted when

its own

Vernon

foreclosure

Hirata

R.

663

sale for
Tab

1.)

Accordingly, TSL should not be allowed to assert its creditor
status even though the security later proved insufficient.
The

foregoing

argument

finds

McMillan, 245 P. 98 (Idaho 1926).

support

in

McMillan

v.

In McMillan the creditor was

fully secured by a mortgage on certain real property of the
24

debtor at the time the debtor made a gift of other real property
to his wife.
the

The creditor foreclosed on the mortgage, bought at

foreclosure

sale

for

less

than

the

debt,

obtained

a

deficiency judgment, and then sought to execute on the wife's
real property to satisfy the deficiency.

The Idaho Supreme Court

held that because the creditor was fully secured he was not the
type of "creditor" fraudulent conveyance laws were intended to
protect

and

fraudulent.

therefore,

the

debtor's

conveyance

was

not

The court stated;

[I]t must be kept in mind that this action is by a
secured creditor, one who held mortgage security for
the payment of his debt.
The transfer in no way
endangered the mortgage security. The creditor neither
alleged nor proved that the mortgaged property was not
of sufficient value to pay the debt when...the gift was
made to [the debtor's wife]....The transfer was not
fraudulent, if the husband had sufficient remaining
property to pay his debt, and [the wife] was under no
necessity at trial to prove that [the husband's]
property was sufficient, when the gift was made, to pay
the debt, in the absence of evidence on behalf of [the
creditor] that the property mortgaged to secure the
payment of the debt was not sufficient for that
purpose.
245 P. at 99.
The cases cited by TSL in part II.A. of its brief are not to
the contrary.

In Furniture Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v. Deamer,

680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984), the creditor was unsecured.

In Meyer

v. General American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), "there was
no dispute in the lower court" as to the creditor's status.
P.2d at 1096.
P. 765

569

And in Qqden State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40

(1895) the Fraudulent Conveyance Act had not yet been
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enacted; the issue of the creditor's status was not discussed;
and the value of the security was not mentioned.
Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the trial court's

ruling on the basis of TSL's fully secured status at the time of
the conveyance,
B,

Lack of Fair Consideration
The trial court's ruling is also supported by the

undisputed fact that Baird's conveyance into trust was made for
fair consideration:

the trust assumed approximately $1.7 million

of

in

Baird's

debt

exchange

approximately $1.7 million.

for

a

property

valued

at

It is absolutely essential that TSL

establish that the conveyance was made without fair consideration
for the conveyance to be set aside as fraudulent.
Manufacture Sales Inc., v Deamer. 680 P.2d at 400 n.ll.

Furniture
This TSL

has not done.
Fair consideration, as defined by § 25-1-3, requires that
the exchange be (1) a "fair equivalent" and (2) "in good faith."
See Meyer v. General American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah
1977) .

TSL failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that

either of these elements was lacking.
1.

Fair Equivalent Exchange
It

is

widely

held

that

assumption

of

the

grantor's bona fide debts by the grantee constitutes a valuable
and sufficient consideration for the conveyance of the grantor's
property.

37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 22 (1968) .
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Moreover, it is widely held that the grantee's assumption of a
mortgage on the property transferred is fair consideration for
the transfer.
P. 2d

757,

E.g.. Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal.App. 2d 617, 199
7523

(1948)

(sister's

assumption

of

brother's

mortgage); Matusik V. Large, 85 Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457 (1969);
Eskelson v.
N.Y.S.

2d

Inter-County
(1960)

Title Guaranty

(wife's assumption

& Mortgage Co. , 207

of husband's mortgage).

Thus, the only issue in this case is whether the value of the
debts assumed by the KOA Trust were a "fair equivalent" of the
value of Meadowview.
Utah law is well settled that "fair equivalent" does not
mean

"exact

equivalent."

Utah Assets Corp v.

Association. 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741 (1937).

Dooley

Bros.

Consideration

is sufficiently equivalent if it is not "an unreasonably small
proportion" of the property transferred.

Ned J. Bowman Co. v.

White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962).

Transfers that

have been held so disproportionately small as to not be a fair
equivalent include paying 10% of the value of equipment, Meyer v.
General American Corp. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), and paying 13%
of a property's proven worth, id. at 1097 (citing First Security
Bank v. Vrontikis, 26 Utah 2d 422, 490 P.2d 1301 (1971).

On the

other hand, in Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah
577, 70 P. 2d 738

(1937) this Court upheld the conveyance of

property worth about $14,000 to $15,000 to satisfy a debt of
$10,000.

Thus,

the

proportion
27

of

debt

to

the

property

transferred in that case was 67%-71%.
In the instant case, TSL concedes on page 16 of its brief
that the appraised value of Meadowview was numerically equivalent
to the value of the debts assumed by the trust.

TSL states:

"The parties agree that [Meadowview] had a fair market value of
approximately

$1.7

Trustee

assumed

'debts1

to

million.

the mortgage

Baird,

his

family

As purported

consideration

the

liability

$1.2 million

and

and

of

friends

of

$.5

million."

Appellant's Brief, at 16.
As discussed in Point I. supra, TSL did not dispute at the
trial court level the bona fide nature of the debts assumed by
the trust.

TSL may not now raise this as a factual issue on

appeal, and accordingly a fair equivalence existed at the time of
transfer.
Furthermore, even if the family debts are not counted, the
remaining debts assumed

(approximately $1,535,750, using TSL's

figures) are 90% of the value of Meadowview.

Such a figure is

not disproportionately small when compared to figures in the Utah
cases just discussed.

It is not "so manifestly inadequate as to

shock the moral sense and create in the mind at once, upon its
being mentioned, a suspicion of fraud."

Utah Assets Corp. v.

Doolev Bros Ass'n. supra, 70 P.2d at 742.

Accord Peterson v.

Wilson. 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 199 P.2d 757, 763 (1948) (disparity
between the value of the property and the debt assumed must show
"gross inadequacy of consideration").
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Furthermore, the mortgages alone equal 80% of the value of
Meadowview, which is a higher proportion than in Utah Assets
Corp, v, Dooley Bros, supra, and is still a fair equivalent.
Compare In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434, 442-448 (Bankr. Utah 1982)
(70% is reasonably equivalent).
TSL argues that the entire transaction must be subject to
rigid scrutiny because the trustee of the KOA Trust is Baird's
son and three of the twelve Trust creditor's are close family.
In Utah,

as elsewhere, although

transactions

between

family

members are subject to close scrutiny, "that fact alone does not
render the conveyance fraudulent."

Ned J. Bowman Co. v. Whitef

13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963

(1962).

In numerous Utah

cases, transfers between close relatives have been upheld as not
being fraudulent conveyances.

See Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White.

supra (son's transfer to father); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d
287, 351 P.2d 959 (1969) (father's transfer to sons); Lund v.
Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937) (husband's transfer to
wife); Road Runner Inn, Inc. v. Merrill, 605 P.2d 776 (Utah 1980)
(husband's

transfer

to

wife);

Utah

Assets

Corp.

v.

Dooley

Brothers Association, 92 Utah 557, 70 P.2d 738 (1937) (family
corporation's transfer to family member); Boccalero v. Bee, 102
Utah 12, 1226 P.2d 1063 (1942) (brother's transfer to sister).
Under even close scrutiny the KOA Irrevocable Trust is seen
to be a bona fide trust for the purpose of securing creditors.
For two years after the challenged conveyance the Meadowview
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lessee made lease payments to Baird, who in turn endorsed

the

payment checks over to the KOA Irrevocable Trust and sent them to
the trustee,

(Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at 72-76.)

The

KOA Trust made all of the payments on the assigned mortgage debts
except for the first payment made by Baird during the transition
when the trust took over the mortgage payments, and this payment
was reimbursed to Mr. Baird by the Trust.
Nelson Baird, at 142, 144-145.)

(Deposition of John

Under the terms of the trust the

trustee has 20 years from the date the trust is instituted to
satisfy the various debts to the specified creditors.

Presently

the obligations to the non-family creditors have not yet been
paid.

But as the value of Meadowview appreciates over time and

the mortgages are paid down, sufficient equity will exist in
Meadowview to pay all of the specified creditors upon the sale or
refinancing of Meadowview.

Accordingly, the fact that none of

the non-family creditors have yet been paid is not any evidence
that they will never be paid or that the trust does not intend to
carry out its express purpose, which is to secure and otherwise
provide "for the payment of certain obligations of the trustor.11
(KOA Irrevocable Trust Agreement, R. 211-212, Add. 7.)
TSL argues that there was never any expectation or promise
of payment

of

Baird's family members

rendered.

TSL misstates the record

for the services they
in this respect as the

question of expectation or promise was never posed to Baird on
the deposition pages cited by TSL and therefore it cannot be said
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that there was no expectation or promise of payment.

(Deposition

of John Nelson Baird, at 42-52.)
TSL argues that because no record was kept of the family
debts, they are not valid.

However, recognizing the atmosphere

of trust and informality inherent in intra-family transactions,
this Court has upheld a transfer from a parent to family members
for services rendered despite the fact that no record was kept.
Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960).
2.

Good Faith

Although

the

words

"in

good

faith"

are

used

in

the

definition of fair consideration found in § 25-1-3, it is clear
from the case law that the key to determining fair consideration
is the "fair equivalent" element discussed above.

TSL has not

cited a single case where a conveyance was held to be without
fair consideration where, as in this case, the consideration
given was numerically equivalent to the property transferred.
However, inasmuch as TSL went to great lengths in its brief to
show the lack of good faith surrounding this transfer, some space
will be devoted to it here.
The trial court properly found as a matter of law that the
transfer of Meadowview to the KOA Trust was made in "good faith."
This term, although not defined in the Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
has elsewhere been defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction

concerned,"

U.C.A.,

1953,

§

70A-1-201(19),

and

"honesty of purpose and integrity of conduct with respect to a
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given subject."

Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. 1963).

As mentioned above, TSL has the burden of proving lack of good
faith by clear and convincing evidence.

Furniture Manufacturers

Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984).
The purpose of the disputed transfer was not dishonest: it
was to provide for payment to and give preference to Baird! s
unsecured creditors.

Regarding preferences, this court has held

that an intent to prefer one's creditors does not support the
conclusion

that

the

transfer

lacks

good

Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1261 (Utah 1987).

faith.

Butler v.

Surely TSL cannot

claim Baird acted in bad faith in setting up the Trust to provide
security for payment of debts owing to his unsecured creditors
when TSL has at all times been

fully

secured and when its

deficiency judgment against Mr. Baird is solely a result of TSL
purchasing the property for significantly less than its appraised
value at its own foreclosure sale.
place

in Utah

rather

Had the foreclosure taken

than Hawaii, TSL would

likely not be

entitled to any deficiency inasmuch as Baird would have been
credited with the fair market value of the home on the date of
the foreclosure sale, rather than only $385,000.

(See U.C.A. §

57-1-32 (1953 as amended.)
TSL

argues

that

several

indicia

require a finding of bad faith.

of

fraud

in this case

These alleged indicia include:

(1) no fair equivalence was exchanged; (2) the trust prefers the
trust

creditors

over

other

creditors;
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(3)

the

purported

consideration

(Baird's

debts)

was

falsely

created

to

give

appearance of exchange; (4) the trust benefits Baird; (5) three
of the creditors are close family members, and the trustee is
Baird's son; (6) Baird ignored the trust; (7) Meadowview was
Baird's most valuable asset; (8) there was current and impending
litigation, with creditors in pursuit; (9) the trust was kept
secret; (10) the failure of the trust to file tax returns; and
(11) other miscellaneous indicia, including Baird's insolvency,
lack of adequate record keeping, the trust's inability to pay
trust debts, lack of payments to specified, non-family creditors.
Based on the undisputed facts and applicable law, the trial
court properly found that the above items are either not valid
indicia of bad faith or are not clear and convincing evidence of
bad faith, as follows.

(1) As discussed

in Point III.B.l.,

supra, a fair equivalent exchange existed here.

(2) As discussed

in this subpoint, intent to prefer legitimate creditors does not
support the conclusion of lack of good faith.

(3) As discussed

in Point I, supra, TSL failed to dispute at the trial court level
the bona fide nature of Baird's debts, and is therefore precluded
from doing so on appeal, and the debts were in fact bona fide.
(4) As discussed in Point II, supra, the trust does not benefit
Baird, but rather his unsecured creditors.

(5) As previously

discussed, the mere fact that transferees are family members does
not invalidate the trust; it must be coupled with other factors
such as lack of fair consideration to be an indicia of fraud.
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Furthermore, the benefit to family members constitutes only about
10% of the value of Meadowview.

(6) As discussed in Point

III.B.l, supra. Baird did not ignore the trust, but in fact
endorsed lease payments to the trustee and mailed them to him.
(7) The only asset transferred was Meadowview; thus this case is
unlike cases where the debtor transfers all his assets.

(8)

There was no current or immediately impending litigation, since
the trust was created 16 months before TSL initiated foreclosure
proceedings on the Baird's home. (9) The transaction itself has
not been kept secret.

The conveyance into trust was immediately

recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder and made a matter of
public record.

(10)

Tax returns have not been filed for the

trust because the records necessary to prepare such returns are
in Honolulu with Mr. Baird's accountant.

There are some disputes

concerning Mr. Baird's personal taxes which involve the transfer
of the property to the trust.

Due to these disputes several

extensions have been filed and the records have been unavailable
for use in preparing the trust returns.

(11) The remaining

indicia are not sufficient to show clearly and convincingly a
lack of good faith.
Furthermore, balanced against the alleged indicia or bad
faith are numerous indicia of good faith supporting the trial
court's ruling.
1.

These include:

There is nothing unusual about the establishment of

this trust, as it is a common method of providing for payment of
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financial obligations;
2.

Baird retained no beneficial interest whatsoever or

lingering strings of control over the trust;
3.

The

trust

instrument

does not

insulate

the trust

payments to Baird from Baird1s creditors;
4.

The expressed

intent of the trust was to benefit

Baird's creditors;
5.

The actual effect of the trust is to provide security

for and a method of payment to the specified creditors which
constitute the totality of Baird's unsecured creditors (TSL is
among the secured creditors); and
6.

The

value

of

the

debts

assumed

by

the trust

is

numerically equivalent to the value of Meadowview at the time of
the transfer to the trust.
One of the cases cited by TSL, Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d
287, 351 P.2d 959 (I960), supports defendants' position.

The

debtor was a sheep rancher who in 1952 borrowed money to purchase
an automobile sales business.

For several years prior to 1952,

the debtor's sheep ranching operation had been run by his four
sons.

No actual contract between the sons and the father was

ever written or agreed upon and no definite records were kept of
the amounts due them for their services.
ordinary

expectation

father's business.

of

eventually

The sons had only the

participating

in

their

In September 1952 the father conveyed the

sheep and the sheep ranch to his sons; he also conveyed his house
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to all his children.
May of 1953.
automobile

These conveyances were not recorded until

During that same month, creditors started suing the

sales business, which was

forced

out of business

before the end of 1953.
The

creditors

of

the

father

sought

to

conveyance of the sheep ranch to his sons.

set

aside

the

The conveyance was

upheld despite the following "indicia of fraud" as alleged by
TSL:
1.

A close family relationship between the transferor and

transferees;
2.

No actual contract of employment between the father

and the sons and no records kept of the exact amount due the
sons;
3.

Secrecy, i.e., a delay in recording the conveyance

from the father to the sons;
4.

Conveyance of the debtor's most valuable assets for

the benefit of his family, to the exclusion of other creditors;
5.

Current and impending litigation against the father

with creditors in pursuit;
6.

Conveyance of the father's home to all of his children

without any material consideration whatsoever.
In upholding the conveyance, this Court pointed to a number
of factors that can be considered indicia of good faith.

In

response to the charge that there was no specific contract nor
debt due the sons, this Court mentioned defendants' rejoinder
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that the sons naturally did not deal at arms length with their
father but had faith in his intention eventually to make it right
with all of them.

In response to the charge that the house was

conveyed without any consideration, this Court stated that "it is
elementary that the love and affection that a father has for his
children is sufficient consideration to support a conveyance,
absent fraud."

351 P.2d at 963. The Court also pointed out that

the creditors of the father, who had originally sold him the
automobile business, were secured and that this fact, as much as
any, supported the trial court's determination.

Id.

The other Utah cases cited by TSL are not to the contrary.
In Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942), and Lund
v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937), the conveyances were
held as not being fraudulent despite badges of fraud present in
both those cases.
of

fair

In none of the remaining cases in which lack

consideration

consideration

given

was

found

numerically

transferred, as in this case.

was

the

equivalent

to

value
the

of

the

property

For example in Meyer v. General

American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), the major basis for
finding the transfer to be in bad faith was that the transferee
gave only one-tenth the value of the property transferred.

This

court pointed to other indicia of fraud merely as further support
for the trial court's finding of lack of good faith. 569 P.2d at
1097.

And in Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P. 2d 420 (Utah

1986)# the issue of good faith was not even addressed.
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In sum, the undisputed circumstances of this case adequately
support the trial court's determination that TSL failed to prove
lack of good faith or lack of fair consideration,
POINT IV
TSL Did Not Raise the
"Actual Intent to Defraud" Theory
at the Trial Court Level
and Should Therefore Be Precluded
from Raising It on Appeal
TSL

argues

for

the

first

time

on

appeal

that

Baird's

transfers to the KOA Irrevocable Trust violate §§ 25-1-7 and 251-8 of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which are based on
actual

(as distinguished

creditors.

from constructive) intent to defraud

TSL had ample opportunity to raise this theory before

the trial court, but chose not to.

Therefore, TSL should be

precluded from raising it on appeal.
One of the most fundamental, axiomatic rules of appellate
review is that this Court will not consider on appeal matters
neither raised in the pleadings nor presented to the trial court.
E.g. , Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co. , 659 P.2d
1040 (Utah 1984); Obradovich v. Walker Brothers, 80 Utah 587, 16
P.2d 212 (1932).
and practical.

The reasons for this rule are both theoretical
As a matter of legal theory, the Supreme Court's

jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the case made in the court
below, and therefore this Court will not consider questions not
heard or determined by the trial court.

United States Building &

Loan Association v. Midvale Home Finance Corp. , 86 Utah 522, 46
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P.2d 672, 673 (1935), denying rehearing of 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d
1090.

As a practical matter, orderly civil procedure requires

that a party present all his theories of recovery to the trial
court.

Having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some

different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a "merry-goround of litigation."

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.. 692 Utah

754, 758 (1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors., 24 Utah 2d
301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970)).
For example, in Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d
301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970), the plaintiff submitted the case to the
jury on negligence, and this Court refused an appeal to consider
plaintiff's contentions relating to strict liability. In Davis v.
Mulholland, 24 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970), the plaintiff
claimed mutual mistake of fact at the trial court level, and this
Court

refused

to

consider

on

appeal

plaintiff's

claim

of

unilateral mistake of fact.
In this case, TSL had ample opportunity in its pleadings and
at the hearing to present a theory based on § 25-1-7 or 25-1-8,
but failed to do so.

To the contrary, the issue of factual fraud

or actual intent to defraud creditors under U.C.A. §§ 25-1-7 and
25-1-8 was never raised in any pleading, memorandum, during oral
argument or at any other time in the proceedings.

In fact, TSL

made it clear that it was not asserting an actual intent theory;
one of TSL's sub-points in its Original Memo is entitled "Mr.
Baird's Actual Intent to Defraud TSL Need Not Be Proven" and
39

states in pertinent part:
Under the Act, Mr. Baird's actual intent to defraud TSL
is not an element of the claim.
Summary judgment
should be granted on the basis of the Trust documents,
the trustee's testimony and other uncontradicted
evidence that (1) Mr. Baird's conveyance to the Trust
was made while he was indebted to TSL and others; (2)
Mr. Baird is insolvent (i.e., that he was and is
heavily indebted and that TSL has been unable to
collect its judgment) and (3) Mr. Baird's conveyance of
property was not made for fair consideration, (i.e.,
that the Trust did not pay equivalent value and prefers
Mr. Baird and his family to legitimate creditors).
(TSL's Original Memo, R. 102; see also TSL's Reply Memo, R. 293294.)

At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary

judgment, TSL stated that its action was based on just three
grounds, none of which included a theory based on § 25-1-7 or 251-8.

(Transcript of proceedings, R. 664-665.)

By attempting to

raise this ground on appeal, TSL is trying to keep in motion a
"merry-go-round" of litigation.
TSL will doubtlessly reply to the foregoing by pointing to a
statement in the trial court's "Order Re: Summary Judgment" that
says, "Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was in violation of
the

Fraudulent

Conveyance

Act

in

that

allegedly:...(7)

the

conveyance into trust was actually fraudulent (intentionally)."
(Add. 1-6.)

Any reference to actual fraud in the Order is due to

inadvertence, and does not change the fact that the issue has
never been raised or argued by TSL in this case.

Upon discovery

of the error in the Order, Respondent immediately filed a motion
with this court for leave to have the District Court amend its
Order.

That motion was denied by this Court.
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Nevertheless, the

statement in the Order is subject to review by this Court, which
has before it all the pleadings and a full transcript of the
hearing, and can therefore judge on its own the accuracy of the
statement.

The above statement is in error insofar as it implies

that TSL ever claimed or argued, pursuant to §§ 25-1-7 or 25-1-8,
that the conveyances to the trust should be set aside, and need
not be accepted by this Court as correct.
Although TSL argued that certain "badges of fraud" existed
in this transaction, this argument was made only in the context
of trying to shift the burden of proof of the required elements
under the constructive fraud statute, U.C.A. § 25-1-4 (see Point
V B, infra) , and in the context of trying to show lack of good
faith under the "fair consideration element of § 25-1-4 (See
Point III B.2, Supra.)

TSL never made the "badges of fraud11

argument in the context of an actual fraud theory under §5 25-1-7
and 25-1-8.

If TSL claims it did raise such a theory it should

be required to point out and cite with specificity where in the
record such arguments were made.
on at least three prior occasions.

This it has been unable to do
(See Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, pp 1922; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Amend Order Re: Summary Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc

(R. 559-620);

Motion for Leave to Allow District Court to Correct Order; all on
file herein).

Accordingly, this Court should not consider on

appeal TSL's theory based on §§ 25-1-7 or 25-1-8.
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Furthermore,

as

discussed

in

Point

III

B.2,

supra,

respondents have shown that the alleged "badges of fraud" are not
present in this case and that the transfer was made in good
faith.

Therefore the trial court could have found as a matter of

law and undisputed fact that TSL could not meet its burden of
showing, clearly and convincingly, that there was actual intent
to defraud.
TSL asserts that fraud issues should not be decided on
summary judgment.

In support, TSL cites two fraud cases where

summary judgment was reversed on the basis of material issues of
fact.

However,

judgment

in

this

fraud

Court has

cases

frequently

where,

as

here,

affirmed
the

summary

undisputed

affidavits, depositions, and other evidence showed no material
issues of fact.

See, e.g. , Clegcr v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516

P. 2d 348 (1973) (purchaser's own deposition refuted allegations
of fraud); A & M Enterprise v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d
700

(1971)

(plaintiffs

failed

to

file

counter

affidavits);

Pioneer Finance and Thrift Co.v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d
389

(1968)

(absence of evidence showing

fraud); McDonald v.

Breinholt, 21 Utah 2d 9, 934 P.2d 462 (1968) (same); Heathman v.
Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962); Shayne v.
Stanley & Sons, Inc.. 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1975).
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POINT V
The District Court Did Not
Commit Reversible Error by the
Standards and Burdens of Proof It Imposed
Regarding the standard and burden of proof governing this
case, the district court held:
[Pjlaintiff has a burden of supporting its contentions
by clear and convincing evidence (burden) and the
established facts show that plaintiff is unable to do
so. (Order Re: Summary Judgment, R. 435, Add. 4)
Contrary to Point IV of TSL's brief, the above statement is
not in error.

As to the proper standard of proof, this holding

is essentially correct, and to the degree that it may be in
error, such error is harmless.

As to the burden of proof, this

statement is entirely correct.
A.

Standard of Proof

As discussed previously, TSL argued to the trial court, and
now

argues

on

appeal, that

Baird's

conveyance

violates

two

statutes: (1) § 25-1-11, making void a trust for the use of the
grantor, and (2) § 25-1-4, rendering constructively fraudulent a
conveyance made without fair consideration while the transferor
was insolvent.
ground,

TSL argues for the first time on appeal a third

(3) § 25-1-7, rendering

conveyances void

for actual

fraud.
TSL concedes in its brief that the correct standard of proof
for

the

standard.

latter

two

The more

grounds

is

recent Utah

the

"clear

cases so hold.

Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v Deamer, 680 P.2d
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and

convincing"
Furniture

398, 399

(Utah

1984): Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 243, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974).
The contrary Utah cases cited by TSL are older and, insofar as
they require a different standard of proof, have apparently been
overruled sub silentio by this Court.
As to § 25-1-11, the grantor-trust statute, a clear and
convincing standard is appropriate for the same reasons it is
appropriate

for

§

25-1-4,

the

constructive

fraud

statute.

Neither section of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act requires
actual

intent

to

hinder,

delay

or

defraud

sections are constructive fraud statutes.

creditors;

both

As discussed earlier,

the purpose of § 25-1-11 is to prevent debtors from fraudulently
transferring property out of the reach of creditors.
Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1975).
are constructive

fraud

Leach v.

Since both statutes

statutes, the same

standard

of proof

should apply to both.
Furthermore, even if the appropriate standard for § 25-1-11
is not clear and convincing but preponderance of the evidence,
any error committed by the trial court in applying the incorrect
standard is harmless.

It is well settled that "a judgment should

not be reversed in the absence of error which is substantial and
prejudicial

in

the

sense

that

there

would

be

a

reasonable

likelihood of a different result in the absence of such error."
Arnovitz v. Telia, 495 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1972).

See also Paull

v. Zions First National Bank, 417 P.2d 759, 761 (Utah 1966);
Re Baxters Estate, 399 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1965).
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In

In

this

case,

there

is

no

reasonable

likelihood

of a

different result had a different standard been applied and the
alleged error had not been committed.

As discussed in Point

II.A., supra, § 25-1-11 does not even apply to this case as a
matter of law because by its very terms § 25-1-11 does not apply
to real property.

Furthermore, as discussed in Point II.B.,

supra, the question of whether the KOA Irrevocable Trust is "for
the use of" Baird is not a close call.

Under applicable law, the

KOA Trust is very clearly for the benefit of Baird1s unsecured
creditors and not for Baird's benefit, and is obviously not the
type of trust contemplated by the grantor trust statute.

Whether

the trial court applied the clear and convincing standard, or a
much lower standard of proof, the result on the grantor-trust
issue would have been the same, i.e., there was no dispute as to
any material fact and it was shown that TSL could not meet its
burden

(even if by preponderance) that the trust was invalid

under § 25-1-11.

Consequently, even if the trial court erred in

applying the incorrect standard of proof to the grantor trust
issue, such error was harmless.
B.

Burden of Proof

TSL argues that the trial court erred by not shifting the
burden once TSL made a prima facie showing of the elements under
§ 25-1-4.

This argument is without merit, for the following

reasons.
First, Utah law does not require such an elaborate burden
45

shifting mechanism under § 25-1-4 as TSL claims.

The general

rule, as stated in the recent case of Furniture Manufacturers
Sales v. Deamer. 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984), is that plaintiff
simply has the burden of proving that he was a creditor, that
defendant was insolvent or would have been rendered insolvent by
the transfer, and that the conveyance was made without fair
consideration.
must

"Where these burdens have* not been met, the case

be dismissed."

680 P. 2d

at

400 n.10.

As discussed

previously in Point III, TSL failed to prove all three of these
elements.
TSL cites Brimhall v. Grow, 25 Utah 2d 298, 480 P.2d 731
(1971) ,

for

the

proposition

that

somehow

the

burden

of

establishing these three elements can be shifted to the debtor.
Brimhall is inapplicable because the quoted language in Brimhall
expressly refers to § 25-1-8, not § 25-1-4.

Furthermore, in

Brimhall no consideration supported the transfer, while in this
case the transfer was clearly supported by fair consideration.
480 P.2d at 734.

Finally, even if Brimhall was applicable to

§ 25-1-4 cases, it has been overruled by Deamer, supra.
A second reason why TSL's argument fails is that it has
incorrectly attempted to import the "badges of fraud" concept
from § 25-1-7 (actual intent to defraud), where it belongs, to §
2 5-1-4, where it does not.
belongs with

The badges of fraud concept properly

§ 25-1-7 because of the difficulty

proving actual intent to defraud.
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of directly

Such proof is nearly always

circumstantial, and accordingly the courts have developed the
badges

of

fraud

concept

to

aid

in

circumstances will show actual fraud.

determining

just

what

As discussed above, TSL

never raised or discussed "badges of fraud" in the context of
§25-1-7.
Section 25-1-4, on the other hand, is a constructive fraud
section
intent.

designed

to

obviate

the problems

of proving

actual

Its three elements of creditor status, insolvency, and

lack of fair consideration can be directly proven.

Thus the

badges of fraud concept has no place in proving § 25-1-4.
To support its argument that the badges of fraud will shift
the burden of proof under § 25-1-4, TSL cites a line of Utah
Cases beginning with Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051
(1932), and followed by Zuniga v. Evans. 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513
(1935); Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937); and
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942).
of

cases

suggested

circumstances
consideration)

that

(transfer

under
to

a

near

the burden under

certain

combination

relative

§ 25-1-4

This line

without

is shifted

of
fair

to the

transferee to show good faith of the transaction.
A close reading of the Paxton cases shows that they are
distinguishable for at least two reasons.

First, the rule in

Paxton was not applied to § 25-1-4 or another constructive intent
statute; the language of the opinion suggests that the statute at
issue

involved

actual

intent

as
47

distinguished

from

intent

presumed by law.

Second, the rule in Paxton was qualified in

Zuniga v. Evans, supra, to be a rule of procedure, not a rule of
evidence.

In effect, it places the risk of going forward rather

than the risk of persuasion on the defendants.
Furthermore, the Paxton rule has been superseded by a longer
and more recent line of cases.3
is not placed

In this line of cases the burden

on the defendant, but instead remains on the

plaintiff to prove the elements of § 25-1-4.
For a very complete and scholarly comparison of the Paxton
cases to the cases cited in the foregoing footnote, this Court's
attention is directed to the opinion of the Honorable Judge Ralph
Mabey in In re Groomsf 13 B.R. 376, 379-84 (Bankr. Utah 1981),
which is included in the Addendum, pages 99-107.
Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977),
cited by TSL, does not shift the burden at all.

Its only

reference to "indicia of fraud" is as additional support for the
trial court's finding of lack of good faith.
Qgden State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765 (1895),
also

cited

by

distinguishable

TSL,

is

a

pre-Uniform

for several reasons:

3

Act

case

that

is

it was concerned with

See Gust in v. Matthews, 25 Utah 168, 70 P. 402 (1902);
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932); Williams v.
Petersen, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935); Cardon v. Harper, 106
Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99 (1944); Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244,
342 P.2d 867 (1959); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d
959 (1960); Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d
962 (1962); Meyer v. General American Corp., 564 P.2d 1094 (Utah
1977); Road Runner, Inc. v. Merrill, 605 P.2d 776 (Utah 1980).
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actual

intent

to defraud;

the consideration

there, under an

estoppel by deed theory, was treated as nil; and it deals with
services performed by minor children.
demonstrates

that

services

by

Givan v. Lambeth, supra.

adult

children

are

valid

consideration.
Furthermore, in any event, the recognized badges of fraud
are not present in this case, as discussed

in Point IV.B.2,

supra.

CONCLUSION
The law and undisputed facts show that TSL is not entitled
to judgment under any of the theories presented to the trial
court.

Therefore,

respectfully

requests

based

on

this

Court

the

foregoing,

affirm

the

Respondent

ruling

of

the

District Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants
and denying summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
DATED this 9th day of March, 1988.

z>KJeLs5r<Z.
Randall S.^Feil'
Michael Ferrin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing
document by mailing, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy to
the following on this 9th day of March, 1988.

John K. Baird
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Norman J. Younker
Merrill F. Nelson
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

<-U.

Secretary
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HAND-DELIVERED
August 21,

1989

1
Ms, Mary T. Noonan
Court Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

' - • - = - .17S39
•&i

Territorial Savings & Loan Association v.
John N. Baird, et al., Case No, 870234
Respondents1 Citation of Supplemental Authorities

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Defendants/Respondents in the above case hereby submit
their Citation of Supplemental Authorities.
The additional
citations set forth herein are submitted to supplement the portions
of Respondents1 Brief containing citations to the deposition of
John Nelson Baird.
The deposition of Mr. Baird was cited by
respondents in their Brief under the belief that the deposition had
been filed with the district court. However, respondents have
since learned that the deposition of John Nelson Baird was never
filed with the district court, and therefore cannot be considered
part of the record on appeal. Consequently, respondents hereby
supplement their Brief with appropriate citations to the record
which support the statements previously supported only by citations
to the deposition of John Nelson Baird.
The Respondents1 Brief is hereby supplemented as follows:
1.
The first citation on page 3 of Respondents1 Brief is
amended to read as follows: (Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R.
184, add. 26; Affidavit of Joy K. Baird, R. 265, add. 91, 92;
Exhibit C to the KOA Irrevocable Trust Agreement, add. 17.).
2.
The second citation on page 3 of Respondents1 Brief,
which citation follows the first full paragraph on page 3 is
amended to read as follows: (Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R.
184, add. 33; Affidavits of John Knapp Baird, R. 244, add. 89, 90;
David Lincoln Baird, R. 263, add. 84, 85.).

Ms. Mary T. Noouan
August 2 1, 19 8 9
Page 2

ihiici citation .. page J of Respondents1 b r ^ i , ^...^.a
citation follovr the second fall paragraph on page 3 is amended to
read a^ ^ " " o\ ^ f f ^ a v N 0 f jolii! Nelson Bali"-:7 **• •
. -• :
2 3.)
-,v. jj.i.^c v,..,
o n p a g e 4 o f R e s p o n d e n t s 1 B r i e f is
amended tc read a s follovs
(Affidavit o f J o h n N e l s o n ^-- i rn rind
:
Exhih ? ' - e r e t c , " 19
.il\ ~ r • ; .
o second ntatio:
. p a ye :
kesp \dent~ Bilef,
which citatior 4 l , ^v
tl •. L i rst full
.jiaph o n p a g e 4 is
amended t o rea.; <A t- ;ioui
(Exhibit C t o K O A I r r e v o c a b l e T r u s t ,
R. 221, ad- ; • !»f ^ J ' ^f J o h n Knapr> B a i r d , 34-40 ) .
6.
Tij^. iij.ci v.
amended to read as fo
R. 221, a-"
;
Affidavj t * ..,,ii ht'.t
203-209, „
-:' -•=".! *

*

on page r> or Respondents1 Brief is
(Exhibit C to KOA Irrevocable Trust,
• of John I .app Baird, 34-40, 44-48;
.-• - d and Exhibits C and D thereto, R.

7.
m e i . ? . u n citation on page 6 of Respondents' Brief,
whicL citation toljrws the first full paragraph on page 6 is
amended tc read as follows:
(Affidavit of John Knapp Baird
Regard!^
••- *---,*.
iirst citation on page 30 of Respondents1 Brief,
"wi lie ii iallows the sentence "for two years after the challenged
conveyance the Meadowview lessee made the lease payments to Baird,
who in turn endorsed the payment checks over to the KOA Irrevocabl e
Trust and sent them to the Trustee11, is amended to read as follows:
(Affidavit of John Knapp Baird Regardi ng T^1^'- Accounting).
Very truly yours,
Edwards, McCoy :» Kennedy

7/^<—\ '/'-/<V ':ha'.'l I . T'err j n
MLF:db
cci
cc:

Merri ;
Kirt c;

Heison
McConkic

A Poelman

J o h n B;ai d

Corbrd.ige, Baira L C h r i s t e n s e n

